Chinese president calls on developing nations to jointly meet challenges

Chinese President Hu Jintao (2nd R) poses for a group photo with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2nd L), Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (1st L), Mexican President Felipe Calderon (C) and South African President Thabo Mbeki ahead of their meeting in Berlin, capital of Germany, June 7, 2007. (Xinhua/Liu Jiansheng)

Chinese President Hu Jintao says developing countries should do more to meet the challenges that come with economic globalization. He made the call in a speech on the sidelines of the G8 where he also met leaders from Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa.

Earlier on Thursday, President Hu also held meetings with his Nigerian counterpart, Umaru Yar'Adua and Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh.

Hu Jintao says the world economy has seen a new round of growth and that developing countries are looking for ways to expand that also match their national conditions. He also noted that developing countries have become an important force in maintaining world peace and promoting common development.

But President Hu also pointed out that such countries are often disadvantaged in the course of world development and that economic globalization is presenting new challenges.

Hu Jintao says the populations of China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico account for just over 40 percent of the world's total adding that the five major developing countries have an increasingly important place in global economy and trade.

President Hu put forward a three-point proposal to safeguard common interests, create favorable development conditions and boost coordinated development.

The first point is to enhance coordination and expand space for development. He says developing countries should urge the United Nations to boost input for development and strive to increase their say in the global economy. Hu Jintao has also stressed that developed countries should meet their commitments and provide more assistance for developing countries. He's suggested that developed countries write off or reduce debts, and increase investment in, and technology transfer to, their less developed counterparts.

Hu Jintao's second point is to step up cooperation, especially in such areas as trade, investment, personnel training, infrastructure, culture, education and health. He said new platforms, such as the Summit of South American-Arab Countries, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, have also boosted South-South cooperation.

The last point he proposed was to maintain and improve meeting mechanisms. President Hu says the five countries should prepare well for meetings among their leaders and within the UN framework. He says they should also take follow-up steps afterwards, maintain close consultations, share experiences and expand common ground to achieve concrete progress.

Hu Jintao emphasized that China supports continued dialogue between developing and developed countries. He said it is necessary to increase the say of developing countries, and work to establish a new global partnership for development based on equality and mutual benefit.

In the meeting, the leaders from the five nations also pledged to abide by the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" while tackling climate change. They urged developed nations to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emission.

On the Doha round of WTO trade talks, the leaders said efforts should be made to conclude negotiations at an early date, and that results should reflect the interests and concerns of developing countries. They also urged developed nations to reduce subsidies for agricultural products and lower import tariffs.

China ’s Presence in Africa

China and the African continent are currently celebrating the renewal of their partnership. For China Africa is a source of coal and oil, and for the African states China is an ideal commercial partner that imposes no special political conditions upon its suppliers, and even gives them diplomatic backing. But Sino-African relations come into conflict with the interests of the United States, itself concerned about diversifying the sources of its oil imports. A key issue here is that Africa's enthusiasm for China may rapidly fade, because, in time, rises in agricultural prices will have a negative impact on African economies.

François Lafargue

China and the African continent are currently celebrating the renewal of their partnership. For China Africa is a source of coal and oil, and for the African states China is an ideal commercial partner that imposes no special political conditions upon its suppliers, and even gives them diplomatic backing. But Sino-African relations come into conflict with the interests of the United States , itself concerned about diversifying the sources of its oil imports. A key issue here is that Africa 's enthusiasm for China may rapidly fade, because in time rises in agricultural prices will have a negative impact on African economies.

Quite early on, at the time of the 1955 Bandung conference, the People's Republic of China was still in state of revolutionary euphoria, and displayed an interest in Africa because the dark continent had become a battleground in the struggle between the West and the Soviet Union [1]One visible sign of China 's interest was the building of the so-called Tazara [2]in East Africa , to provide support to independence movements like Unita in Angola [3]. China was also the first non-Arabic country to recognise the provisional government of Algeria , which was set up in 1958. Nonetheless, after the death of Mao Zedong, China 's presence in Africa became more discrete, confining itself to certain states like Benin . For the last few years, however, China has been showing a more marked interest in Africa , as can be seen from Hu Jintao's visit to Egypt and Gabon , followed by Algeria in January 2004.

This article will outline the present state of Sino-African relations, before analysing the reasons behind the current rapprochement and its possible lines of development.

A renewed partnership between China and Africa ?

Trade between China and Africa may still be modest, but it has grown significantly. In 2003 the total value of the transactions between the two was US$18.5 billion, as opposed to US$12.39 billion the previous year. Currently China is one of the major trading partners with many African countries ( Gabon 's second largest client after the United States , second largest supplier of goods to Benin , fifth largest to South Africa , sixth largest to Algeria , etc.). Chinese companies in the field of Building and Public Works (BPW) have become competitors with French conglomerates like Dumez and Bouygues. In recent years China has vastly increased its infrastructural building projects [5], this being a sector in which it has undeniable expertise and competitive ability. Despite all this, Africa is still terra incognita for China .

In West Africa , when the president of Benin , Mathieu Kérékou, took power in 1972, he was supported by Peking , and he re-established the diplomatic relations severed since 1967. Mr. Kérékou made three visits to China , in 1976, 1986 and 1998. China built the Benin Friendship Stadium in 1982, followed two years later by the Manucia factory for making cigarettes and matches. From May 1987 to April 1993, China and Benin were partners in the Associated Benin Textiles Industries (SITEX)[5]. China also built the Lokassa hospital for them in 1997.

However, the African continent currently accounts for only 2.3% of China 's exports, and 2% of its imports[6]. And Sino-African commerce consists predominantly of trade with South Africa , which represents 20% of the trade with the continent as a whole. This situation is perfectly normal, since the South African economy is still the most dynamic in the region, with a GNP equivalent to that of all the other sub-Saharan African states combined. China 's second major customers are Nigeria , Egypt , Morocco and Algeria , followed by Sudan and Benin (See Table 1).

China 's financial activity in Africa is another notable feature. Everyone knows nowadays that China is the primary recipient of direct overseas investments, amounting to US$53 billion in 2003, but is actually also now one of the major sources of such investments. In 2003 China was fifth in the world, after the United States , Germany , the United Kingdom and France . Its overseas investments totalled US$2.087 billion, which represented an increase of 112% over the amount for 2002, and made it an active presence in 160 countries. China is investing massively in raw material deposits overseas, and is multiplying its trading partnerships in order to secure regular supplies. China 's presence has undergone rapid expansion in both Latin America and Africa . In 2002 its total overseas investments (leaving aside Hong Kong and Macao ) amounted to US$5.083 billion, of which 25% were in North America , 9.5% in Latin America , 8.7% in Africa , and 8% in Australia . The main recipients of Chinese investment in Africa are Zambia [7], South Africa , Mali , and Egypt ( see Table 2).

China 's arrival in Africa provides African countries with a new horizon. Unlike France and the United States , China makes no specific political demands, and allows African countries to retain complete sovereignty. China 's only demand for entering into commercial relations is a complete break of links with Taiwan [8]. But Peking allows African countries to vote as they please at the United Nations, does not propose to deploy any troops on their territory, and above all refrains from lecturing African governments on democracy. Its intention to re-establish relations was marked in 2000 by the foundation of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) . Nearly all African states belong to this organisation [9], and it commits China to adopt measures to support African economies (such as lowering customs duties, and granting tourist exit visas to Chinese citizens etc.) [10]. The first meeting of this forum was held in Peking in December 2000, and the second in Addis Ababa in December 2003.

China has agreed to take a more active part in peace-keeping operations in Africa . In January 2005, 598 Chinese soldiers served with UN blue berets in Liberia . China also sent forces, though less numerous, to the Western Sahara as part of UN operations there, and to Sierra Leone .

Co-operation with Peking offers further real advantages. China provides know-how to its raw materials providers, plus a labour force, low-interest loans, and favourable financial conditions for infrastructural building projects. It does not restrict its presence in Africa to the petroleum-producing countries, and is expanding its commercial activities in East Africa , particularly in Kenya and Tanzania . In Kenya , the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) is currently among the leading BPW companies in the country. China has also built the Tambach-Kabarnet road in the West and renovated the Mombasa-Nairobi road. The CRBC has set up its regional headquarters in Nairobi , and this provides it with a base for developing its activities throughout East Africa .

China's motives for its presence in Africa

Oil deposits

Peking has become very anxious about China 's energy dependency [11]. In 2000, it was the eighth leading oil importer, and by 2003 it had risen to number four, after the United States , Japan and Germany . This year it will probably be number three. In 2000, oil imports represented 27% of its total consumption for 1999, rising to 37% in 2002, and are calculated to reach 45% in 2005. Such dependency presents major obstacles to the global role that China intends to play. Until 1990, its principal suppliers were Indonesia , the sultanate of Oman , and Iran . Extending the list of its suppliers has become imperative because of its increasing domestic consumption and the depletion of Indonesian reserves [12]. Naturally, Africa has become a tempting territory because, following US intervention in Iraq , that country has consolidated its control over all the countries of the Middle East , with the exception of Iran . Added to which, the deposits in the Caspian Sea have been disappointing, only representing somewhere between 2% and 4% of global reserves, according to conflicting estimates. China is especially fearful of American initiatives in this area of the Caucasus , of which GUUAM [13]is an example. Founded in 1996 with the joint support of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, this organisation is intended to advance economic and military co-operation between its member states in close collaboration with the United States , and to deal with such matters as the fight against terrorism, the settlement of local conflicts, etc. The five founding members share a common platform in refusing the presence of Russian forces on their territory. But one of the main aims of GUUAM is the building of a supply network, independent of Russia , with the support of the Atlantic alliance. Peking shares Moscow 's view that GUUAM is a mechanism for allowing Washington not only to pursue a policy of encirclement aimed at Russia , but also to expand it later to include China [14]. Admittedly, China is attempting to bypass GUUAM through rapprochement with Kazakhstan , but still the threat of encirclement weighs heavily on it. So Africa allows Peking to reduce its dependency on these energy supplies, since the African continent possesses 8.9% of global oil reserves [15]and represents 11% of global production. China is currently the second major importer of African oil, after the United States . Africa supplies 25% of its requirements as opposed to 15% in the 1980s (see Table 3).

Hu Jintao's African tour of Egypt , Gabon and Algeria in January 2004, was part of this drive to extend the number of China 's oil suppliers. In Libreville , Hu Jintao signed a joint accord with his host, Omar Bongo, for the prospecting and production of oil. Likewise, the Total-Gabon company and the Sinopec (China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation) signed a sales contract to supply China with one million tons of Gabon crude in 2004. Peking has become the third major purchaser of oil from Gabon , after the United States and France , and trade relations between the two countries are expanding. For example, over 60% of Gabon 's timber is exported to Asia , mainly to China . And China has given US$2 million to Libreville , and has granted a further US$6 million as an interest-free loan.

During this same African tour, various agreements were signed a few days later in Algiers , mostly dealing with oil supplies. Relations between Algeria and China have always been close. The commercial and technological links which were established straight after independence have been growing in strength ever since. The China State Construction and Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), which is China 's leading BPW company, has frequently won public works contracts in Algeria . China is currently Algeria 's seventh largest overseas supplier, and in 2002 Sinopec signed a 420 million euro contract to develop the Zarzaitine oilfield in the Sahara . Another Chinese company, the China National Oil and Gas Exploration, is also due to build a refinery in the Algerian desert, near Adrar.

China is an ever-growing presence in the exploitation of the oilfields in Congo-Brazzaville. In 2003, it imported a million tons of Congolese crude oil, which is 1.5% of its total imports. Oil is the Congo 's primary export commodity, and provides two-thirds of the national budget's revenues. In 2003 its production levels stood at 11.3 million tons, and official figures forecast the same amount for 2005. The French conglomerate Total produces two-thirds of this Congolese black gold, followed by the Italian ENI. On February 23rd 2005 , Sinopec signed a contract to allow it to exploit the off-shore deposits known as "marine 12" and "deep sea C".

Operating through the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), China also takes an active role in the Sudan , together with the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company of which it is a 40% shareholder, in the exploitation of the Muglad basin. This joint venture has built a 1,500 kilometre pipeline to take the oil from the south of the country to the Marsa al-Bashair harbour terminal near Port-Sudan on the Red Sea . Currently Sudan alone is believed to account for 7.7% of China 's total oil imports.

But the United States also has its eye on these African oil and gas fields, so Africa now finds itself as a field of conflict between these two powers.

Bill Clinton's whistle stop tour of Africa in 1998 [16] marked a visible turning point in US policy towards Africa , because until the 1990s US relations with Africa were characterised by complete indifference. Sure enough, the Americans were quick to recall some of their initiatives in the area, like their support for the creation of Liberia in 1847 or their commitment to the independence movements after the Second World War. But Africa 's share of trade with the United States stood at 1%. Another sign of this indifference was the fact that for three centuries only four American presidents had made an official visit to Africa : Franklin Roosevelt to Cairo in 1943, Jimmy Carter to Nigeria and Liberia in 1978, Bill Clinton in Spring 1998, and George Bush five years later. In recent years the United States has shown far greater interest in Africa .

With regard to US energy needs, Africa (especially Nigeria and Angola ) has become one of its major suppliers of petroleum [17], and US imports from Nigeria amount to over half the quantity imported from Saudi Arabia . With the support of the World Bank, the United States also intends to bring the deposits in Chad on stream [18]and it has participated in building a pipeline leading to a terminal in Cameroon . The relaxation of American economic sanctions against Libya in February 2004 also promises to encourage a return of investments to that country.

There is no doubt that the clearest example of Sino-American competition in Africa is the situation in Equatorial Guinea . This small country of half a million inhabitants has brought its deposits on stream with the help of American companies, particularly Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, and Triton Energy. At present the US is Equatorial Guinea 's main trading partner, making it the third largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa [19], after Nigeria and Angola . But China has maintained close relations with Equatorial Guinea since its independence in 1968, and is also taking a keen interest. China buys a large part of Equatorial Guinea 's timber production, and is its third most important customer after the United States and the former colonial power, Spain . China is multiplying its investments in local undertakings. A new road, from Bata on the coast to Mongomo in the country's eastern province, is being built with technical and financial assistance from Peking .

China and the United States are also clashing over oil deposits in Angola . American companies have been present in the country for over twenty years, and half of Angola 's oil production is shipped to the United States . But China has also become a major player, buying one-third of the overall production. In October 2004, in return for financial aid, it obtained a 50% share in the Block 18 oilfield, which had previously been held by Shell, but was also fervently sought after by the Indian state-owned company ONGC-Videsh[20]. On February 26th 2005 , during a state visit, the Chinese Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan finalised several contracts with the Sonangol company. And relations are continuing to strengthen. Proof of this is provided by the granting of extraction rights in Block 3/80 (in the north of the country on the same latitude as the city of Soyo ) to Sinopec, at Total's expense, which lost its operating licence. In 2004, China approved a loan of US$2 billion to help in infrastructural redevelopment. There are about twenty projects in progress. Angola repays its creditor with oil exports. The arrival of Chinese joint operatives looks set to make the Chinese community in Angola the largest in Africa .

Commercial reasons

For Chinese companies Africa offers new commercial prospects. Although trade between China and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa is still comparatively marginal, it has nonetheless made considerable progress in less than a decade. China sees Africa as a source of raw materials (such as coal from South Africa and ore from Gabon ) and a market for its manufacturing industry. There too, just as in the rest of the world, China is eradicating its competitors in textiles and manufactured goods. She also sees in Africa a market which allows it to test its industrial products, and to offer them to less demanding customers. The Zhongxing Telecom company is multiplying its outlets in Africa (for example, renovating the telephone network in Djibouti ), including the Maghreb countries. With 900 million potential consumers, the African market holds considerable promise. And as in Europe and the United States , China can rely on well-established communities, in both the French-speaking West African countries and in those of East Africa . Even though the Chinese populations in the Maghreb countries are minuscule (there are barely a thousand in Morocco ), they are markedly larger in Senegal , Kenya and Tanzania . And despite the way in which Chinese companies tend to become the focus of discontent, being accused of customs evasion and of competing unfairly with the local less-structured economies, African governments retain a favourable attitude, believing that the Chinese intrusion is a way of injecting competitive dynamism, bypassing traditional commercial methods.

Diplomatic issues

The African continent is also a scene of confrontation with Taiwan [21]. One-third of the states that recognise Taiwan are African: Gambia , Burkina-Faso , Liberia , Malawi , Chad , Swaziland , Saõ Tomé and Principe . Senegal severed diplomatic links with Taiwan on October 26 th 2005 . On January 1st 1998 , Taiwan had lost its leading African supporter, South Africa , when Nelson Mandela opted to open diplomatic relations with Peking , after South Africa had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade China to agree to a policy of dual recognition. For its part Taiwan , despite its contacts [22]and the relations established under the apartheid regime with business and military circles, was unable to dissuade Mandela from recognising the PRC. So the remaining African countries which currently recognise Taiwan have limited economic importance and diplomatic influence [23]. But in the diplomatic arena too, China has a major card to play in the attractiveness of its enormous market. With the French withdrawal and the collapse of bipolar relations, some African countries see China as a powerful protector who is less demanding in terms of democratic norms, and less inquisitive about the uses to which its agreed credits are put [24]. On several occasions in July 2004, and again in September, China threatened to use its UN Security Council veto to block the adoption of political sanctions and an oil blockade against Sudan over the Darfour conflict. Resolution 1564, which threatens Khartoum with an oil blockade, was only adopted through China 's abstention, to which it agreed in exchange for a textual amendment, mainly giving management of the crisis to the African Union. China also abstained when the UN Security Council's asserted its control over the International Criminal Court in April 2005, in order to bring those responsible for the crimes in Darfour to justice. In return, China counts on African support for its foreign policy, particularly with regard to its territorial claims in Chinese waters.

African countries, especially those with sensitive relations with the international community, rely on China , not only to counterbalance pressure from the United States and France , as in Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville, but also to end their international isolation, and even to supply arms. In 1996, Peking had no compunction in supplying Sudan with F-7 surveillance aircraft (modelled on the Soviet Mig 21) and with Y-8 transport planes (based on the Antonov). China and Angola have also strengthened their military co-operation, with Peking delivering light armoured vehicles and equipment.

Is China just an investor or a predator in Africa ?

China 's economic take-off has brought benefits to African countries, giving them a new export outlet and, more importantly, bringing a welcome and significant rise in the price of raw materials. Between 1992 and 2002, China 's steel consumption rose by 20% while the global average was 4%. Mineral ores like nickel and copper, indispensable to the electrical and electronics industries, have risen considerably since 2001. In 2005 the price of nickel on the London spot market was 16,255 euros per ton as compared with 3,725 in December 1998. China can also take part of the credit for South Africa's economic growth (3.6% in 2002, and 3.7% in 2004) as well as for the improvement of the financial situation in Algeria and Nigeria (which in 2003 experienced growth rates of 6.8% and 10% respectively). But, as Jean-Pierre Angelier observes, "the current upward trend is the outcome of conjoined factors ... particularly the simultaneous growth in the American and Chinese economies. With a growth rate of 3.1% in 2003, the GDP of the United States increased by US$323 billion in real terms, whereas China's GDP for the same year, with a growth rate of 7.8%, increased three times less in real terms (by US$96 billion) [25].

African euphoria is likely to fade soon, owing to the significant rise in the price of agricultural products. African countries are still major importers of grain, such as maize and wheat. Here too China 's development is palpable, but in a negative direction. Although the goal of feeding a population of more than a billion has been achieved, the position of agriculture in China is nonetheless precarious. Admittedly, progress since the 1960s has been spectacular. China is now the world's leading wheat producer (91 million tons in 2004), ahead of India , Russia , the United States and France . It is also the leading producer of rice (176 million tons), ahead of India and Indonesia . In twenty years pig production has quadrupled, and now represents 50% of total global production.

But we should not be blinded by these flattering statistics. Not only should the figures be treated with caution but, above all, the antiquated storage and transport facilities are the cause of serious losses. In reality, production is stagnant. In 1986, China produced 177 million tons of rice, and fifteen years later the figure was more or less the same. In wheat production too China had the same harvests as fifteen years earlier. The land available for agriculture is particularly restricted (7% of the overall land mass [26]) and is constantly being reduced by urbanisation [27]. Following its membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), China will have to make a big effort to modernise its agriculture and produce larger yields. But the results are likely to be disappointingly undermined by population growth. So in the agricultural domain China is still subject to the need to import from the United States and its allies, Canada , Australia and Argentina . Agricultural foodstuffs represented 5.3% of total imports in 1998, and 4.5% in 2001. But in real terms, the volume of imported agricultural food products rose steadily, albeit less rapidly than overall imports [28]. From 1998 to 2001 the agricultural deficit increased threefold[29]. China is the fourth largest importer of agricultural products after the European Union, Japan and the United States [30]. While there are certainly some measures which can be taken to alleviate this dependence on food imports, through encouraging home production via financial aid packages and increasing prices to reduce the flight from the countryside, such remedies are not always adequate.

In reality, several factors in China combine to produce a gloomy forecast. The future is clouded by the reduction in useable acreage, the increasing scarcity of water for irrigation, and the rising standards of living which are changing patterns of food consumption. Increasing grain purchases on the international markets will inevitably have negative consequences for Africa . In 2002-2003, Morocco , Algeria and Egypt imported 15 million tons of wheat, mostly from Canada . Sub-Saharan African countries have little impact on the international grain markets because of the low levels of their imports, but any price increases will still have serious financial consequences for them. Nigeria has become the first major African importer of rice, and Africa in general buys a quarter of global rice imports[31]. Although there is currently no fixed global price for this cereal (since only 6% of global production is exported), the prices fixed by Thailand , the major global exporter (25%), are a useful benchmark. In Africa , everyone admits that the price of rice is rising continually. In addition to the increase in world market prices (averaging 10% since 2001) rising shipping costs are also having their effect.

Similarly, the termination of the multifibre agreement in January 2005 is producing real anxiety in Africa . Several countries where weaving is a major economic activity, are fearful of Chinese competition. Textiles are Morocco 's leading export, representing 45% of its industrial employment, but Chinese industrialists can offer prices 50% or 60% lower than the Moroccans or Tunisians. While the geographical and cultural proximity of the Maghreb countries to the European Union operates in their favour (allowing quicker delivery times), this advantage will probably last for only a limited period. In sum, then, relations between China and some of the countries of Africa do not appear equitable. In exchange for its construction projects, China sometimes makes demands that are felt to be excessive, like the granting of large-scale fishing rights.

China 's dynamic presence in Africa is therefore developing along several different lines. And as Chris Alden emphasises in his paraphrase of the title of Shintaro Ishihara's booklet, " Africa can say no"[32]. African countries must demand more equitable economic relations with China . They should not be satisfied with just exporting their raw materials but should receive technological transfers in exchange. Taking advantage of the potential fears aroused by the emergence of China , India is attempting to offer African countries a more equitable partnership. India , who faces the same problem of energy dependence, is unable to rival China in financial terms but offers its suppliers technical co-operation (such as technological transfers, the Sofcomp information technology project, medicine sales etc.). This competition between the two Asian giants could be favourable to the development of the African continent.

Remarks:

[1]For the relations between China and Africa after decolonisation, see Zhang Hongming, "La politique africaine de la Chine", published by the Centre d'étude d'Afrique noire (CEAN), Bordeaux, 2000, and Jiang Chung-lian, "Le pétrole, nouvelle dimension des relations sino-africaines", Géopolitique africaine, No. 14, Spring 2004.

[2]The Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Tazara) linking Lusaka , the capital of Zambia , with Dar es Salaam , was built in 1975. Nowadays it carries little traffic, owing to its outdated infrastructure.

[3]When it was created by Jonas Savimbi in 1968, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was backed by China . But after 1976, this movement against the Portuguese colonial presence shifted towards the United States .

[4]These included building a telephone network in Ethiopia, an airport terminal in Algeria, the Méroé dam in the Sudan, the Imbouli hydro-electric dam on the Congo river in Congo-Brazzaville, the Yaoundé Congress Hall, the Lagdo dam in Cameroon, the Palace of Culture in Abidjan, the National Assembly building in Libreville, etc.

[5]In November 2004, SITEX was declared bankrupt and closed down.

[6]In 2003, the value of exports from China amounted to US$438 billion, and imports were US$412 billion.

[7]China invested mainly in the copper mines in Zambia (fourth largest producer in the world) and in Shambezi.

[8]Nonetheless, China 's conduct remains pragmatic. In 1991, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Central African Republic and Taiwan , China continued to respect its commercial contracts, particularly to build the Mbali dam, contradicting its verbal condemnations.

[9]Those who do not have diplomatic relations with Peking , like Liberia and Malawi , send observers.

[10]By the end of 2004, Chinese tourist groups were able to visit Ethiopia , Kenya , Mauritius , the Seychelles , Tanzania , Zambia and Zimbabwe .

[11]According to the International Energy Agency report, " China 's Worldwide Quest for Energy Security", 2000.

[12]Between 1991 and 2002, Indonesian oil production fell by 20%.

[13]Acronym for Georgia , Uzbekistan , Ukraine , Azerbaijan and Moldavia .

[14]Nearly ten years after it was established, GUUAM's record is very mixed. At the time of its summit meeting in Yalta in July 2003, Uzbekistan was absent and asked to be granted observer status only. This decision was because of Tashkent 's desire to establish better relations with China and Russia . Moreover, Uzbekistan has joined the rival Shanghai Group organisation. Just before the Yalta summit, the Moldavian president, Vladimir Voronin, was very pessimistic over the future of GUUAM. This organisation's mixed character itself gives rise to a certain scepticism, since the priorities and objectives of its members are so diverse. For Georgia and Azerbaijan the main concern is the control and protection of the pipelines, whereas for Uzbekistan it is the fight against Islamism. But in recent months this alliance has been resuscitated. Mikhail Saakashvili's victory in Georgia in January 2004, followed a year later by Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine , suggest that ties with Washington are about to be strengthened. Early this year, Vladimir Voronin announced a major turn in his country's foreign policy by setting the goal of joining the European Union. Finally, the Tulip Revolution in Kirghizistan has strengthened American influence in the region, and holds out the possibility of expanding GUUAM still further.

[15]According to the "BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2004", 90% of all African oil reserves are in Libya, Nigeria and Angola.

[16]In ten days, the American president visited South Africa , Botswana , Ghana , Rwanda , Uganda and Senegal .

[17]According to the WTO report for 2003, the United States imports 14% of its oil from Africa (5.8% from Nigeria , 3.2% from Angola , and 1.9% from Gabon ) as opposed to 18% from the Middle East , and 30% from Latin America .

[18]The exploitation of the Doba basin reserves began in October 2003, and by next year it should allow Chad to double its financial reserves. The N'Djamena government has entrusted this project (involving the extraction of 30,000 tons per day) to an international consortium consisting of the American companies Exxon Mobil (40%) and Chevron (25%), along with the Malaysian Petronas (35%).

[19]From 1997 to 2004, Equatorial Guinea 's oil production expanded nearly six-fold, reaching 17.4 million tons per year, slightly above Gabon 's level (12 million).

[20]Just like China , India 's fuel dependency will continue to increase. By 2006, 75% of its oil requirements will have to be imported.

[21]Jiang Chung-lian, "Pékin et Taïpeh: les enjeux africains", Géopolitique africaine, No. 10, Spring 2003, pp. 239-254.

[22]Chris Alden and Garth Shelton emphasise that Taipei made generous campaign donations to the ANC in 1994; see "Camarades, Parias et hommes d'affaires", Politique africaine, No. 76, December 1999, pp. 18-29.

[23]In 2003, trade between Africa and Taiwan was worth a total of US$4 billion dollars, of which 31.8% was with South Africa , 18.8% with Angola , 13.5% with Congo , 11.3% with Nigeria , and 5.8% with Egypt .

[24]In his article "La Chine à l'assaut du marché africain", Le Monde diplomatique, May 2005, pp. 6-7, Jean-Christophe Servant points to the case of Angola , where a part of Chinese aid will probably go towards the electoral campaign by president Dos Santos' MPLA in 2006.

[25]Jean-Pierre Angelier, "Croissance chinoise et marchés mondiaux de matières premières", Politique étrangère , Vol. 69, No. 2, Summer 2004, p. 317.

[26]China has to feed 20% of the world's population with less than 10% of its arable land.

[27]China 's usable agricultural land is particularly restricted, standing at 0.08 hectares per head, compared with 1.8 in Russia , 1.75 in the USA , and 0.19 in India . For a discussion of the food situation in China, see Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "Vers une crise alimentaire en Chine et dans le monde? Entretien exclusif avec Lester Brown", Perspectives chinoises, No. 42, July-August 1997, pp. 11-20.

[28]Between 1998 and 2001, China 's total imports multiplied by 1.4, but its agricultural food imports multiplied by only 1.2.

[29]See the FAO report, "Compendium d'indicateurs sur l'alimentation et l'agriculture en 2003".

[30]China is already the world's leading importer of soya beans. It has an agricultural deficit which in 2002 amounted to US$3.45 billion. By way of comparison, the European Union's agricultural surplus was US$20 billion and the US surplus was US$2.75 billion.

[31]Nigeria , Senegal , Ivory Coast , Benin and South Africa account for 10% of global rice purchases. Rice production is subject to climatic swings and can vary considerably. China was an importer of rice in 1995, and an exporter in 1998, 1999 and 2000. Although China is only number six among the world's rice importers, its purchases are rising steadily, from 172,000 tons in 1999 to 339,000 tons in 2002, and 404,000 tons in 2003. See International Rice Research Institute, http://www.irri.org/. .

[32]Chris Alden, "Leveraging the Dragon: Towards "An Africa That Can Say No", http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5336, March 1st 2005 .

Wen calls for more access for Africa

Wen Jiabao, China's premier, on Wednesday called on developed nations to deliver on promises of aid and market access for Africa and pledged Chinese help in speeding economic and social development on the continent.

For more detail, please visit: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/34e52c64-0365-11dc-a023-000b5df10621.html

Chinese Premier Pledges Continued Help For Africa

China's Premier Wen Jiabao has told representatives of the African Development Bank meeting in Shanghai that China is sincere about helping Africa develop. This is the first time the bank has held its annual board meeting in Asia, a sign of the growing significance of China-Africa relations. Daniel Schearf reports for VOA from Beijing.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, center, Rwanda's President Paul Kagame, left, and Cape Verde President Pedro Pires, right, at the opening ceremony, 16 May 2007

The African Development Bank sessions are focused on infrastructure development and poverty relief. The meeting is the second time China has hosted a major Africa event in less than a year.

At the opening of the two-day meeting Wednesday in Shanghai, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to honor Chinese commitments made at last November's China-Africa Forum to double aid to Africa by 2009, and provide $5 billion in development funds.

Mr. Wen said Africa's development is good for all, and he called on developed nations to increase aid and debt relief.

"Africa's gradual development requires relying on its own hard efforts. And yet, it cannot be separated from the international community's support and help," he said.

China is now the largest investor in Africa among developing countries, with $11.7 billion invested in Africa.

But critics say China is acting as colonial powers once did, exploiting African resources with little regard for local workers and developing local industry.

China has also been criticized for ignoring human rights abuses in countries like Sudan in its quest for energy and raw materials to feed its growing economy.

Joseph Cheng, a Professor of Political Science at City University in Hong Kong, says in hosting the meeting, China is seeking to position itself for an even larger role in Africa.

"Offering to host the conference in Shanghai is a rather cost-effective way of raising China's international status as a symbol of the increasing cooperation, economic cooperation between China and African continent," he said.

Chinese officials say that their country's trade, investment and aid have helped African development and poverty relief.

Mr. Wen said China has already canceled about $1.4 billion in African debt and plans to cancel another billion dollars.

He says China has sent medical personnel to Africa and funded hundreds of infrastructure and public projects in a sign of its commitment to development.

Beijing Appoints Africa Envoy to Focus on Darfur

China has appointed a special Africa envoy whose first task will be to focus on the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region. The appointment was announced after U.S. lawmakers warned China of a backlash if it does not do more to pressure Sudan. Claudia Blume reports from Hong Kong.

China's new special envoy on African affairs is Liu Guijin, a former ambassador to Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu told reporters in Beijing that Liu will initially work on the conflict in Darfur.

Jiang said since the Darfur issue raises a lot of concerns in the international community, the first task of the special representative will be to focus on that issue.

The appointment came a day after more than 100 U.S. lawmakers sent a strongly worded letter to China's President Hu Jintao, asking him to take immediate action to help stop bloodshed in Darfur.

They warned that the 2008 Beijing Olympics could be tainted because people will link China's government with Sudan and atrocities committed in Darfur.

The United Nations says more than 200,000 people have died in Darfur since government-backed militia and rebels started fighting there in 2003.

China, a veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council, buys much of Sudan's oil and is one of the largest investors in the country. Beijing has been criticized for not using its influence to force Sudan's government to end the violence in Darfur.

Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang did not respond directly when asked to comment about the U.S. lawmakers' letter.

Jiang says that China and the United States have the same goal on the Darfur issue and that both want to solve the issue by political means.

Earlier this week, Beijing announced it will send engineers to support international peacekeepers in Sudan's Darfur region.

Concerns Mount about Chinese Oil Interests in Africa

A resident of Nigeria's oil-rich delta region looks at flames from an oil firm's gas flare. China is investing heavily in Africa's oil fields

China has made no secret of the fact that it needs more natural resources to further develop its country and people. It's the most populous nation in the world, with a population of 1.3 billion. Some analysts see China's interest in Africa, and recent large-scale investments on the continent, as evidence that the country is bent on "plundering" Africa for its own selfish purposes. At the center of this exploitation, they say, is China's thirst for oil. Beijing, however, says it's dedicated to developing the continent, and underplays its influence in Africa's oil industries. In the third of a five-part series focusing on China in Africa, VOA's Darren Taylor explores the country's heightened interest in the continent's oil reserves.  

China received less than nine per cent of Africa's total oil exports last year, according to senior Chinese government official, Sun Baohong, who says 36 per cent of African oil in 2006 went to Europe, and 33 per cent to the United States. 

International security analyst, David Goldwyn, agrees that there's a lot of "hyperbole" about China's oil interests in Africa. 

"China's influence in the oil market in Africa is not so significant - but there are some real issues to be dealt with," he says.  

Goldwyn and other analysts are convinced that China cannot maintain its current growth without increasing its dependence on African oil.

"Energy is a big driver for Chinese behavior and that is because China at one point was self-sufficient, and as its economy has grown, it is now the world's second largest consumer of crude oil in the world – almost seven million barrels a day in 2005, and that number's certainly higher now. And they are the third largest importer at 3.1 million barrels a day – and that number's probably higher also," Goldwyn explains. 

He says China's relatively rapid growth from an impoverished, agrarian country to global economic power has been a "big shock" to the world, but that it is "unquestionably a good thing for the Chinese economy to grow – nobody blames the European economy and the US economy for growing and wanting more oil; nobody should blame China either. But the fact is: they need a lot more oil."

Where the US has failed to secure diverse oil supplies, Goldwyn asserts, China has succeeded.

"China has very successfully diversified its supplies away from what was a very dominant reliance on the Middle East, to where it now relies on Africa for a significant portion of its oil, and also Eurasia."

According to Goldwyn, the US gets most of its African oil from Nigeria and Angola, with a "scattering" from other countries.

"The 1.8 million barrels a day that we (the US) got from Africa in 2005 was 18 per cent of what the US consumed (that year). China took a lot less oil from Africa - out of 1.7 million barrels a day it imported, less than 800,000 came from Africa - but it was 31 percent of their imports," he outlines.

The message to be taken from this, says Goldwyn, is that Africa is a "very strategic supplier of oil to China – way more strategic than Africa is to the United States. Africa is important to the United States. But you can see the difference in priority that Africa has in Chinese foreign policy, and Africa has in US foreign policy, in small part, by this difference."

Stephen Morrison, of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic International Studies in Washington D.C., says competition between the West and China over African oil – specifically in the Gulf of Guinea - is set to increase significantly.

"There's every indication that the Gulf of Guinea's going to remain a very hotly competed and very attractive source, and that we're going to see more discoveries and more competition and it's going to be centered around Nigeria and Angola, but with other energy-rich states involved as well."

Goldwyn says the US remains the "most important" consumer of Nigerian and Angolan oil, but that China takes more oil from Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan.

"So you can see here that there is success for Chinese foreign policy in developing strong relationships with certain African suppliers, and that some countries are more important to it than others."

Goldwyn says there's also a lot of hype about China striving to "lock up" supplies of African oil for itself, but that this isn't supported by the facts. 

"Some of the supply that they own…they don't even take into China; it's traded on the open market."

Morrison says China's failure in 2005 to purchase Unical, the American oil and gas firm, was perceived in Beijing as a "spiteful" attempt by the West to thwart China's globalization efforts and economic expansion.

"The accelerated entry by the Chinese into Africa on the energy side of things, in the minds of policymakers and energy executives in China, is directly linked as a reaction to that defeat…This (failure to seize possession of Unical) has been a motivating experience for the Chinese."      

Goldwyn says China has lots in common with the West in terms of energy security. 

"We both need security of supply because we want to keep our economies going. We both want access to acreage in other countries, because both have companies that try and exploit oil, develop oil and bring it to the market. We both need a safe operating environment because Chinese workers get kidnapped in Nigeria and other places just like US workers or European workers, and we both want to protect our investment. And both the US and (Europe) and China have political and moral and security goals."

Goldwyn says Africans also want a safe operating environment for their citizens, and they, too, want to promote development.

"They want to leverage oil wealth for development, to respect local communities, to maintain social peace, and they want to be more secure and not less secure because of the oil, and they have their own political, moral and security goals."

Western and Chinese companies are faced with a dilemma when operating in violence-prone oil regions in Africa, says Goldwyn.

"What's the best way to be safe? Is it to take sides in conflict areas; is it to be close to the government and to help the government do its job? Or is it to stay as far away as possible from the government when it's doing security? And here we have the Niger Delta and Sudan as case studies."

The Chinese are desperate to secure additional supplies of African oil, says Goldwyn, and are therefore willing to take great risks – including investing in and pouring manpower into strife-torn areas in Africa - to achieve their aims. Beijing has invested heavily, for example, in Nigeria's Delta region, where rebels are fighting the government for a share of the oil wealth.

In Ethiopia's Ogaden region, rebels recently attacked an oil field and killed nine Chinese oil workers, abducting several others.

But Goldwyn says the question observers of Africa's oil industries are asking is not one concerned with violence - but rather with corruption.

"There is no question that African governments leave money on the table - and large sums of it – when they do private deals rather than tendering (oil) blocs in an open way," he claims.  

Pang says concerns in the West that China's oil relationships with Africa are based on corruption are "hypocritical" given allegations that Western companies' have for years been bribing African politicians for access to oil.  

Sun, a former director of what she describes as China's "oil project" in Angola, says much of the criticism vented at China's involvement in Africa's oil sector is unfair.

"When we initiated our project of cooperation with Angola, I was not a genius, I was no professional to think out how to engage in oil transactions with Angola. What we did was to learn about how Angola had dealt in business with Brazil, Spain and even Germany. And I don't know why those countries are not picked for criticism. And now China is again and again picked for criticism with regard to its oil interests (in Africa)."

But Prof. Ian Taylor, of the Department of International Relations at Scotland's St. Andrews University, says this "what's good for the goose is good for the gander" approach doesn't help Africa, and its continued underdevelopment as a result of "economic mismanagement."   

He harks back to April last year, for evidence that some of China's policies in Africa aren't geared towards anti-corruption.

"When on the very same day that the Dutch were pulling out of Kenya and suspending nearly $150 million worth of aid to Kenya, on the grounds of corruption and mal-governance, the Chinese were signing off on an important oil exploration agreement with Nairobi."

Sun maintains that "good governance in Africa is in the Chinese interest" as well, but that China isn't willing to interfere in other countries' domestic affairs.   

Ultimately, says Goldwyn, it's up to African leaders to ensure that their people reap the benefits from their oil, and don't allow foreign companies – whether Western or Chinese – to corruptly exploit the continent's natural resources.   

But, says Taylor, many of Africa's political elite are themselves corrupt, and to expect them to suddenly change the way they do business and to dedicate themselves to helping their people instead of lining their own pockets, is "overstretching."   

"The question of which way behavior will go, is up to Africans – because the host sets the rules; the countries set the rules. And everyone who invests in a country is going to have to live by them," says Goldwyn.

Sun agrees that Africa's development, and its enhancement of its own natural resources, is in the hands of Africa, not of China.

"Africa must reach an African consensus to reach their development goals, not a Beijing consensus."

Chinese Weapons Sales to Africa Raise Fresh Concerns

Missiles exhibited at the Military Museum in Beijing. Observers are concerned about China's weapons sales to Africa

China is pouring investment into Africa in exchange for access to the continent's natural resources. Its trade with the continent is set to top $50 billion. But China is also selling weapons and ammunition to African states accused of human rights abuses. Some analysts see this as evidence that China is destabilizing rather than developing Africa, as it has pledged to do. But China says it's dedicated to peace on the continent, and it points to its peacekeeping operations in Africa as proof.  In the second of a five-part series, VOA's Darren Taylor focuses on the nature of China's evolving relationship with Africa, and specifically its arms sales to the continent.

Pang Zhongying, professor of international studies and the director of the Institute of Global Studies at Nankai University, describes China's relationship with Africa in largely favorable terms.

He says "three phases" underlie the country's economic relationship with the continent: "Common development, non-interference in domestic politics and the provision of aid that is not tied to political situations." 

China's economic strategy in Africa, according to Pang, hinges on its refusal to "interfere" in the politics of countries it does business with. There are no "political strings" attached to China's aid to and trade with Africa, unlike the assistance provided to the continent by Western donors, he says.

But some analysts debunk the claim of the benign nature of some of China's policies in Africa.  

David Goldwyn, an international energy consultant, uses China's relationship with Sudan as an example.

"Giving military aid to the government of Sudan is not a policy of non-interference. Giving military aid to the government of Sudan has an impact," he says.    

The Khartoum government is allegedly sponsoring a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Sudan's Darfur region, where the United Nations says at least 200,000 people have been killed since 2003. 

China's National Petroleum Corporation has invested heavily in Sudan's oil industry, and human rights activists say Khartoum is using much of the revenue generated by this investment to purchase weapons and ammunition – from China itself.

China's supply of money and arms to the administration of President Omar al-Bashir is perceived by many, including in Africa, as "propping up an unjust regime," says Goldwyn.  

In addition, many weapons found in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is wracked by civil war, are also of Chinese design and manufacture, says Goldwyn, and China supplied arms to both belligerents in the 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 

"There's certainly a feeling (in the international community) that China should begin to behave with more responsibility in Africa," Goldwyn says.   

But Pang says China's military relations with Africa are the "way of the world." He says "other countries, like the United States and in Europe, also sell their weapons to African countries." 

Pang adds: "When it (arms sales) becomes related to humanitarian crises, it becomes a politicized question. My point of view is: Don't politicize this question. Treat this question as a business question."   

But it's Goldwyn's view that China's weapons sales in Africa shouldn't be treated purely in commercial terms, because a "change in the correlation of forces within a country has an impact; it has an impact on the neighborhood and the level of conflict…It certainly had an impact in Sudan, in arming the government in a way that enabled it to do things that it could not have done otherwise." 

Pang's response is that China is a signatory to all the major international arms control treaties, and that it abides by them.

Sun Baohong, political attaché at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., says her country, despite its sale of weapons and ammunition to Khartoum, is committed to peace in Africa, and specifically in the Darfur region.

"If the Darfur crisis could be solved tomorrow, we would be happy. A solution to the issue is in our best interests, because we have great investment in Sudan. But this does not mean that we have unique influence over the government of Sudan. We have influence there, but it has its limits," Sun explains, reiterating that China is "unwilling to dictate to other countries" regarding their "domestic issues."  

She emphasizes that China wants to foster "national reconciliation" in Sudan, because without this, Sun maintains, there will be no peace there.

As evidence of this dedication to peace in Darfur as well as throughout Africa, Sun says that "China has 435 peacekeepers in Darfur serving on medical and engineering teams" and has deployed "many" peacekeepers across Africa.

Stephen Morrison, head of the Africa Program at the US-based Center for Strategic International Studies, says there are 1,200 Chinese "blue helmets" (UN peacekeepers) spread across seven peacekeeping operations in Africa.

While he describes China's security provisions to Africa as "thin," Morrison says the country "certainly puts more boots on the ground than the United States." 

Pang says China isn't trying to change political systems through its peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

"The West has its reservations about this, because China continues to maintain the principles of sovereignty and equality and does not interfere in other countries domestic affairs. It does not export political models and values. It stresses neutrality," he explains. 

"In Chinese diplomacy, sovereignty trumps all other norms, including that of democracy," comments Professor Ian Taylor, of the Department of International Relations at Scotland's St. Andrews University.  

He points out that Chinese official media have described Africa's relatively recent wave of democratization as a "disaster" and Chinese commentators with close ties to the government have argued that multiparty politics fuels social turmoil, ethnic conflicts and civil wars.

"And of course this was welcomed by a variety of African leaders," Taylor says. 

"In fact, liberal democracy has been held up by the Chinese as a source of much of Africa's woes, which goes directly against the Western consensus that lack of democracy accounts for some of Africa's problems."

Sun says China's stance is that "African states must decide what's best for their people, without any interference from outside."

Taylor argues that such a position "makes very little real sense in a milieu dominated by corrupt regimes" in some African countries that are not dedicated to the development of their people, but to self-enrichment.  

"It's precisely because China doesn't ask any questions about the neo-patrimonial regimes it encounters in Africa, that it doesn't criticize the rampant corruption that goes with this and, crucially, doesn't seek to advance meddlesome initiatives related to democracy and good governance that Beijing is the preferred partner of choice for many African autocrats."     

Taylor is convinced that China's "hands-off policy" in Africa in Africa threatens to undermine the very development that China says it seeks to foster.

Goldwyn says it's important to remember that the protection of human rights and the fight against corruption are not Western norms.

"If you look at the African Union, and you look at NEPAD, these are African norms we're talking about here. We're talking about whether we're going to have governments in Africa that live up to the norms which they say they want to follow…. This is not ideological imperialism on the part of the United States or the Europeans; we're talking about living up to standards that Africans have set for themselves."

Goldwyn is certain that China is set to "adapt" some of its policies and strategies concerning Africa. 

"China is evolving its international role. I think the historical policy of non-interference is having to change, because when China does something it has an impact, and when China doesn't do something it has an impact also. And as an international player, those responsibilities are increasing."

Morrison agrees that China "is not going to able to play this so-called non-interference in local politics forever." He uses President Hu Jintao's visit earlier this year to eight African countries, where trade unions protested against poor labor conditions in Chinese factories and human rights groups demonstrated against Hu for China's perceived role in fomenting the Darfur crisis, to bolster his assertion.

"There was a threshold crossed" during Hu's visit to Africa, says Morrison: "The Chinese were surprised and in some cases shocked by the scope and level of intensity" around these issues.

He's of the opinion that the anti-Chinese demonstrations in Africa have contributed to China realizing that it will have to "expand its dialogue about these issues from state to state level, to engaging directly with civil society groups" in Africa. 

Sun agrees that there's room for such expansion, but insists once again that Africa's future with regard to good governance is in the continent's hands, not in China's.

Analysts Explain Significance of Evolving Relationship Between China and Africa

China's President Hu Jintao greets Chinese citizens living in Mozambique during his African tour in February

In recent years, China's activities in Africa have expanded dramatically. Chinese political and business leaders are visiting the continent regularly, and the giant of the Far East is pouring investment and aid into Africa. In exchange, it's securing access to the continent's natural resources, which Beijing considers essential for the further development of China, the most populous country in the world. Chinese officials maintain that they will not "plunder" Africa, but aim to forge relationships on the continent that will be of "mutual benefit." However, concerns remain that China's policies in Africa are not conducive to protecting human rights and combating corruption. Nevertheless, analysts agree that China's new engagement with Africa represents a major transition in the continent's strategic landscape. In the first of a five-part series, VOA's Darren Taylor provides an introduction to China's current relationship with Africa.

"China's unfolding relationship with Africa is perhaps the most significant economic development on the continent in modern times," says the director of the African Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C., Dr Peter Lewis. 

"Images of Africa that are projected within China are very different from the kinds of images that we see of Africa (in the West). In China, Africa is projected as a continent of opportunity, a continent that is on the move, a continent that is not marginal but very central – which is very different from how Africa is portrayed often in the media in the West," says Prof. Deborah Brautigam, of American University's School of International Service, who has been studying China's evolving relationship in Africa since the early 1980s and has written several books on the subject.

China's investment in Africa now stands at $1.5 billion a year, there are at least 700 Chinese enterprises operating on the continent, and China's trade with Africa is approaching $50 billion, according to Lewis. This has made China the second-largest trading partner with sub-Saharan Africa, eclipsing one of the continent's former colonial powers, Britain, which formerly enjoyed the highest economic profile in Africa.

"Aid flows from China to Africa have doubled, even tripled, in the last several years," Lewis says.

In terms of debt relief, China recently wrote off $1.3 billion owed it by African countries, which has led to a fresh injection of good feeling in Africa towards the Chinese.  

Reflecting China's increased interest in the continent, and Africa's willingness to cooperate with Beijing, last November President Hu Jintao hosted 44 African heads of state at the China-Africa summit.

"It's difficult to recall another international event at which 44 African heads of state have attended, excepting perhaps the General Assembly meetings at the UN," says Lewis.

Then, in February this year, Hu visited eight African countries, including continental powerhouse South Africa. 

"China's new engagement with Africa has been dramatic; it has been widespread; it has been reflected in economic, political and security relationships; and it has invited different perspectives," Lewis commented.

"Some people see it as a competitive challenge – as a resource race, an energy competition, a head-to-head zero-sum relationship between the US or Western energy consumers and China's burgeoning economy and its burgeoning demand for energy."

Other observers have interpreted these new relationships between China and Africa as an opportunity for development in sub-Saharan Africa – a region that has been badly marginalized in the international economy over the last two decades, accounting for less than two percent of global trade flows, and only about one percent of direct foreign investment worldwide.

"The prospect of increased attention, focus and economic engagement with Africa would seem to present new opportunities, new possibilities, new resources – and a counterweight, a reduction, of Africa's troubling marginality in the global economic system," Lewis explains. 

Other analysts have also pointed to the alternative model of development presented by Beijing.

"China, after all, was not long ago a poor, agrarian country, broadly similar to some of the development challenges facing sub-Saharan Africa. And as a poor, agrarian country that has become rich in a rather breathtaking climb to greater prosperity, many analysts have said that this presents possibilities for Africa – an alternative development model," says Lewis.

Certain commentators are convinced that China offers Africa a way out of poverty that doesn't involve dependence on the developed world for charity.

But critics have also pointed to "troubling" aspects of the relationship, says Lewis: "(Some see) challenges for governance, economic development and security, arising from the Chinese relationship with Africa. Some critics have said that it represents a new colonialism, that China is basically going in for self-serving interests, principally concerned with natural resources and energy, engaged in lopsided deals with African countries, and that there are not balanced or mutual benefits here."

Other critics have highlighted Beijing's relationship with so-called "rogue states" such as Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan – countries that are perceived to be engaged in large-scale corruption and human rights abuses.

There's a view in the West, says Lewis, that China's relationship will effectively "bail out dictatorships and provide new opportunities for authoritarian regimes" and will detract from democracy efforts in Africa.  

Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe, for example – in rejecting what he terms American and especially British interference in his country's affairs – has stated that he does not need monetary or food aid from the West for his impoverished and famine-ravaged country, because China is providing for Zimbabwe's needs. President Mugabe has repeatedly said he prefers to forge strong relations with China because it, unlike the West, does not place any political conditions on its investments and aid.   

Security analyst David Goldwyn of Goldwyn International, an international energy consultancy firm, says "some of what China is doing is incredibly helpful towards Africa in terms of aid, and investment and infrastructure – and some of it is unhelpful, in that I think it does undermine a lot of the progress that's been made on good governance – maybe unintentionally, but I think it's a fact."                 

According to Pang Zhongying, a professor of international studies and the director of the Institute of Global Studies at Nankai University, the "fear and paranoia" about China's entry into Africa that is sometimes prevalent in "especially the United States and Europe" is "needless."

"The West's current concerns and debates are overreacted and exaggerated. China's renewed Africa policy can be a great opportunity for China-Western dialogues, and cooperation. China-Africa strategic partnership can lead to an Africa-China-West triangle for Africa's peace and development," he says. 

But Pang also questions the West's motives in "sometimes vilifying every move China makes" inside Africa. 

"Why all the noise about China in Africa now, when China has had good relations with Africa since the 1950s?" he asks.

In the 1950s, when many African countries were fighting against colonialism, China's Marxist leader Mao Zedong established political ties with them and showed solidarity with Africans. China began providing arms, ammunition and training to liberation movements' military wings. In the 1960s, when many African countries gained independence, China constructed roads and railways throughout sub-Saharan Africa. This relationship with the continent has evolved today into President Hu's and Premier Wen Jiabao's extended economic links with Africa, chiefly in the form of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), an alliance between China and what its government terms "friendly" African countries for "collective consultation and dialogue and a cooperation mechanism between the developing countries, which falls into the category of South-South cooperation." 

Pang says China "makes no secret" that, through stronger ties with Africa, it hopes to secure the natural resources it needs to continue with its ambitious domestic economic development agenda to satisfy its rapidly growing population, which now stands at 1.3 billion people, by far the largest in the world. 

"But China does not want to plunder Africa," he stresses. "China's relations with Africa will be based on mutual benefit…. Development is the greatest common denominator between China and Africa. Chinese leaders say repeatedly that China is the world's largest developing country. And Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries. So common development can be a common objective to pursue between China and Africa."

But Pang insists that despite all the hype, China's rise in Africa is "limited."

"The value of China's trade with Africa at the moment is about $50 billion – this amount equals the amount of aid African countries last year received from the European Union."

Pang says China's policy of "trade rather than aid" to Africa "shows that the hat of neo-colonialism does not fit China; it is a partner – not a new colonizer."

He predicts that the value of China's trade with Africa will grow to at least $100 billion by 2010 and says China believes it has a duty to help Africa to develop.

"China is itself not a developed country; it has far more in common with Africa than the West. Like Africa, its economy also depends largely on foreign direct investment," he explains.

Out of China's burgeoning economic relationship with Africa, other results have sprung, such as the country's increasing involvement in peacekeeping operations in war-torn nations such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.

China continues to build infrastructure throughout Africa, including sports stadiums and hospitals, and has also established the Confucius Institute in Nairobi, to facilitate cooperation and "better understanding" between China and Africa, says Pang.

Professor Deborah Brautigam of American University's International Studies Department has written several books on China's evolving relationship with Africa. She says only in recent years has China started emerging into a role as a great world power, despite the fact that it has long held a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.  

"What we're seeing today are some of those growing pains still, of China as a great power now in the security area, China as a great power in the economy, China as a great power as a political force, China as a great power as a cultural force. And all of those forms of hard and soft power we see projecting into Africa, in ways that they hadn't been very visible before," Brautigam explains.

"As a result of that, the Chinese are now finding their people being taken as hostage in southern Nigeria, they're finding that people are yelling and protesting as their leaders come to town – just as they did and they still do when they say, 'Yankee, go home!' when American presidents (visit developing countries). This is a new role for China."   

China Rethinks Safety After Fatal Attack on Workers in Ethiopia

The attack this week by rebels that killed 74 people - including nine Chinese - in Ethiopia has highlighted the risks that China faces in its search for oil and other minerals in Africa. Analysts say the attack may cause China to re-think its policy in Africa, but as VOA's Luis Ramirez reports from Beijing, China's rising energy demand will mean business as usual.

Chinese officials on Thursday said they are re-evaluating the safety of Chinese nationals in Africa but said China will not withdraw investment from the continent.

Sinopec, the major Chinese state oil company that owns the operation where the workers were attacked in Ethiopia this week, on Thursday announced it is not pulling out of Ethiopia.

Rebels who say they do not want firms to exploit the region's mineral resources killed nine Chinese and 68 Ethiopians in the Tuesday assault. Seven Chinese nationals are believed to be among a number of people kidnapped and still missing.

With its energy demands skyrocketing, China has been looking more to Africa, to places that many western companies find too risky to operate in.

Economist Mao Yushi, an expert on Africa at the Unirule Institute of Economics in Beijing, tells VOA there is too much at stake for China to abandon its growing African investments. He says China may have underestimated the risks.

"I think the Chinese government's expectations of these risks were too low," Mao said. "These problems have happened not only in Ethiopia, but in Nigeria as well. And there are all kinds of problems in other places. The Chinese government's understanding of Africa was not quite enough."

This week's attack in Ethiopia highlights the price that China is forced to pay for finding new sources of energy to fuel its booming economy.

The assault is not the first against Chinese workers, who are being sent to Africa by the thousands. Kidnappers have seized a number of Chinese workers in Nigeria this year. In February, a Chinese engineer was killed and another Chinese national wounded in an attack on a stone materials plant in Kenya.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jinchao told reporters at a briefing Thursday that Beijing will look for ways to improve the safety of its workers on the African continent.

"In response to these recent incidents concerning the safety of Chinese personnel, the relevant departments are carrying out an assessment of safety abroad to help Chinese businesses smoothly develop economic and trade cooperation abroad and ensure the safety of Chinese personnel," Liu said.

Liu did not elaborate on what options his government would explore to enhance security for Chinese workers. He said a team of officials from the oil company and the Chinese government is in Ethiopia to investigate the attack.

The Chinese government says its policy of encouraging Chinese businesses to operate in Africa will not change.

Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of aiding oil field massacre

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia (AP) -- Ethiopia blamed longtime enemy Eritrea Wednesday for an attack on a Chinese-owned oil exploration field that killed 74 people, escalating the dangerous brinksmanship between the neighboring countries.

At least six Chinese workers and some Ethiopians were taken hostage during Tuesday's dawn attack, for which the rebel Ogaden National Liberation Front had claimed responsibility. The secessionist group is formed from Ethiopia's minority Somalis, has been linked to Eritrea and has had combatants fighting alongside Muslim insurgents in Somalia.

"Hand-in-glove with the Eritrean government, which hates to see Ethiopia's development, the terrorist forces in the region have acted out this horrendous act of terror," said Wednesday's statement posted on Ethiopia's Foreign Ministry Web site.

It called on the United Nations to take action against Eritrea.

Ethiopia: Attackers wore Eritrean uniforms

Eritrean Information Minister Ali Abdu denied the allegation, saying it was "a habitual nonsense statement" from Ethiopia.

Ethiopia and Eritrea, neighboring nations that fought a war over an unresolved border dispute that ended in 2000, have recently traded accusations over involvement in Somalia. Eritrea is accused of backing an increasingly violent Islamic insurgency fighting Ethiopian troops supporting the Somali government.

Tuesday's attackers "were wearing Eritrean military uniforms," Abdullahi Hassan, president of the region in Ethiopia where the attack occurred, told The Associated Press. "We are sure. They were speaking the Eritrean language."

Hassan said the area of the attack is now under control. The attack took place early Tuesday in Abole, a small town 500 kilometers (310 miles) east of Addis Ababa in Somali Regional State and close to the Somali border.

Nine Chinese workers killed; all Chinese staff evacuated

China condemned the attack, the first against a foreign company in the Horn of Africa nation. The bodies of the nine slain Chinese workers were being flown to the Ethiopian capital on Wednesday, before being repatriated to China, said Sun Qing, a Chinese embassy spokeswoman.

She said negotiations were under way to win the release of the hostages and that all Chinese staff were being evacuated. She said she had no detail on whether the attackers were wearing Eritrean uniforms.

Ethiopian troops continued their search Wednesday for the rebel group and the hostages.

Tuesday's attack by more than 200 fighters lasted about an hour, and followed a warning the rebel group made last year against any investment in eastern Ethiopia's Ogaden area. The group said in a second statement posted on its Web site that 400 Ethiopian troops were killed or wounded in the attack. It said the Chinese fatalities were caused by explosions caused by munitions during the battle.

The statement added that the oil exploration field was attacked because ethnic Somalis were driven from their land by Ethiopian troops to make way for the facility.

Rebels warn of further violence, want region to secede

In recent years, the Ogaden National Liberation Front has only made occasional hit-and-run attacks against government troops, making Tuesday's attack its most significant one. It has fought for the secession of the Ogaden region -- an area the size of Britain with 4 million people -- since the early 1990s.

The volatile Somali Regional State, as the Ogaden is known, "is not a safe environment for any oil exploration to occur. We urge all international oil companies to refrain from entering into agreements with the Ethiopian government," the front said in its claim of responsibility sent to The Associated Press.

The Ogaden National Liberation Front described Tuesday's attack as "military operations against units of the Ethiopian armed forces guarding an oil exploration site," in the east of the country.

It did not give any details of casualties, but said they had "wiped out" three Ethiopian military units.

Xu Shuang, the general manager of Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau's Ethiopia operation, said nine Chinese oil workers and 65 locals were killed and that seven Chinese workers were kidnapped. But the group said it was only holding six Chinese workers.

"ONLF forces rounding up Ethiopian military prisoners following the battle came across six Chinese workers. They have been removed from the battlefield for their own safety and are being treated well," the group said in an e-mailed statement.

The official Xinhua news agency reported that the attackers fought 100 Ethiopian soldiers protecting the facility in a 50-minute gunbattle.

Ethiopia is not an oil-producing country. But companies such as the Chinese one and Malaysia's state-owned oil giant Petronas have signed exploration deals.

Xinhua said Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau had 157 Chinese and Ethiopian workers at the facility. The company is a division of the giant state-owned China Petroleum and Chemical Corp. that began its operations in Ethiopia in May 2004, according to its Web site. It began work in the volatile Somali Regional State last year.

China Strengthens Military Ties With Sudan

Chinese officials say they will push forward with military cooperation with Sudan, despite accusations Khartoum supports militias that have killed hundreds of thousands of civilians in Sudan's Darfur region. Daniel Schearf reports from Beijing.

Western nations have long urged Beijing to use its influence with Sudan to get U.N. peacekeepers into the war-torn Darfur region, but China has instead used its veto power in the U.N. Security Council to prevent stronger condemnation of Khartoum.

Qin Gang (File photo)

This week, Beijing moved to strengthen ties with Sudan. During a visit by Sudan's military chief to Beijing, China's minister of defense said his government is willing to further develop cooperation between the two militaries in "every sphere."

China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang Tuesday urged Sudan to be more flexible on the deployment of U.N. troops. But he indicated China would not support tougher measures against Khartoum.

"We think Sudan's territorial integrity and sovereignty should be respected and a political solution should be found to the Darfur issue through equal dialogue and discussions," he said.

China is the biggest buyer of Sudan's oil and a major source of weapons for Khartoum.

U.N. reports say the Sudanese government supports militias that have raped and killed about 200,000 people in Darfur and driven millions from their homes during a four-year civil war.

Washington and London want stronger sanctions imposed against Khartoum for atrocities committed in Darfur, which the United States has called genocide.

Omar al-Bashir, 01 Mar 2007

Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir agreed in November to gradually allow 20,000 U.N. peacekeepers into Darfur to support overwhelmed African Union troops. But Mr. al-Bashir has delayed negotiations on the deployment and now indicates he will only accept technical and logistical support from the United Nations.

On Sunday gunmen killed five AU peacekeepers along the border between Darfur and Chad. It was the deadliest attack since the peacekeepers were deployed to Darfur.

China's relationship with Sudan has prompted human rights activists to call for a boycott of the Summer Olympics being held in Beijing in 2008.